Nuclear Power: A Placebo for Global Warming

Comment: Do not be fool that Nuke Power Plants is green, Uranium Mining is not green, No Reprocessing Nuke spent rods, too expensive and dangerous!

Last week, I wrote about how the difficulties and dangers of storing or disposing of nuclear waste.

This week, I will touch on another option—the aforementioned reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel which has been banned in the U.S. since 1977.

This process reuses old fuel which not only decreases the amount of waste left over but also reduces the need for mining uranium, a process which in and of itself creates radiation and pollution.

The major drawback is that reprocessing creates plutonium which has vast destructive potential.

Former US Ambassador “at large”, Robert Gallucci believes, spent fuel remains one of the clear links between nuclear power and the possible spread of nuclear weapons.” Gunnar Skogmar, author of Nuclear Energy and Dominance: Some Interrelationships Between Military and Civil Aspects of Nuclear Energy in U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1945, believes that, “the military and civil aspects of nuclear energy cannot be separated” because “if a nuclear weapon ladder has ten rungs, nine might be needed for civil nuclear energy.”

In other words, by leading the rest of the world towards the nuclear power we will be also moving possible unstable countries towards development of nuclear weapons. One only has to look at the unrest and instability of nuclear weapon possessing Pakistan or the bellicosity of North Korea and Iran regarding their own nuclear ambitions to see how increasing the number of nuclear weaponized nations might not be the best move for the world.

Despite the voices of opposition, which includes groups such as the US National Academy of Scientists (USNAS), former President Bush pushed for his Global Nuclear Energy Program (GNEP) which proposed that the US lift its thirty-year ban on reprocessing spent fuel and fund the construction of nuclear reactors in developing countries with the intent to supply plutonium created in the US to these countries.

President Bush was not without his supporters. In 2006, when the planned was unveiled, countries including, China, the UK, Japan, Russia, and France supported the plan. Even Mohamed El Baradei, former director of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), supported this new program. With that being said, El Baradei’s support is tempered with caution. He is noted for stating, “Any country has the right to master these operations for civilian uses. But in doing so, it also masters the most difficult steps in making a nuclear bomb” which highlights his awareness of the concerns voiced by Skogmar and the USNAS.

The concerns involved in a switch to reprocessing include: an increase in the amount of plutonium in the world, the cost of reprocessing which is rooted in the need to build not only reprocessing plants but also fast breeder reactors, the only kind which can use the plutonium (the US currently uses light water reactors which cannot run on reprocessed fuel), and the ability of nations to use their newly developed civilian power as a stepping stone to nuclear weapons. These are highly salient concerns, as North Korea, Pakistan, India, South Africa, Iran, Israel, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and South Korea—has each pursued nuclear weapons under the cover of a nuclear energy program. We all know that at least three (Israel, Pakistan and India) have succeed and at least two others (Iran and North Korea) are probably not as far from success as we would like. The question remains—do these concerns outweigh the potential benefits of a predicted decrease in nuclear waste, global cut in carbon emissions, reduced dependence on uranium (and subsequently the negative impact of its mining), and a potential decrease in cost of energy production when compared to once-through cycles used in current U.S. nuclear power plants?

The first issue, increased production of plutonium, has already proven to be a problem for France, Japan and the UK.

All three are currently struggling with their rapidly growing stockpiles of unwanted, uneconomical, weapon-capable plutonium. These countries have not managed to reuse more than 60% of all their reprocessed fuels.

In Japan, this stockpiling of plutonium has placed immense pressure on the nation as it tries to prevent diversion or theft. The stockpiling has been brought on by the inability of these nations to build enough fast-breeder reactors to support the amount of reprocessed fuel created.

Construction delays are largely attributed to cost issues and public opposition.

Additionally, switching to a closed-cycle requires building not only fast-breeder reactors but also fuel-fabrication plants and separation facilities. While awaiting sufficient facilities, this stockpiled plutonium is stored in 2-kilogram amounts in small welded steel cans which safely contain the radiation but are also a little too easy to carry-off.

Because of these overly convenient containers, the plutonium could be stolen or diverted without concerns regarding transport or radiation.

Diversion or theft poses a significant threat since, the amount of plutonium that would be created by this plan would produce about 5 million kilograms per year and the amount of plutonium needed to make a nuclear weapon is less than 10 kilograms. (Since I began writing this blog, a dead Nazi sympathizer’s home in Maine was found to contain numerous containers of radioactive material including small amounts of uranium held in similar small steel cans http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/slain-neo-nazi-wanted-build-dirty-bomb-005238.)

The cost savings are equally debatable. According to Susan E. Pickett, author of Japan's Nuclear Energy Policy: From Firm Commitment to Difficult Dilemma--Addressing Growing Stocks of Plutonium, Progam Delays, Domestic Opposition and International Pressure, proponents believe that they could “ideally produce 60 times more power” from using reprocessed fuel in fast breeder reactors than from traditional fuel in light-water reactors.

In the meantime, the estimated front-end cost for the GNEP ranges from $80-$100 billion. But the Department of Energy estimated that the cost could reach $280 billion and take 117 years to complete—very likely a gross underestimate given the department’s average cost overrun of 500 percent on large capital projects. The price of uranium is so low and the cost of reprocessing so high, that reprocessing spent fuel is not practical. The French national utility, Electicite de France, has admitted that “plutonium retrieved from reprocessing is three to four times as expensive as the same quantity of fuel obtained from low-enriched uranium.”

Putting aside the costs concerns and the technical issues, a real political issue of nuclear weapons proliferation presents itself if the United States leads the world into a wholesale switch to nuclear power, regardless of whether the process used is a once-through process or a reprocessing process.

A huge nuclear expansion would increase the danger of nuclear proliferation. According to Brice Smith, author of Insurmountable Risks: The Dangers of Using Nuclear Power to Combat Global Climate Change, to affect climate change the “world’s capacity to enrich uranium would have to go up dramatically by a factor of 2.5 to 6.” A mere dozen new enrichment plants would produce thousands of tons of plutonium each year. As Smith states, just “one percent of that capacity would be enough to support the construction of 210 nuclear weapons per year.”

Article IV of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows signatories to develop civilian power under the watchful eye of the IAEA, but as we have seen—most recently with Iran and North Korea—such measures can fall short of effectiveness. If every nation were to develop a civilian nuclear program, each such nation could also develop a parallel program not subject to safeguards that can draw on the expertise and resources of the civilian power program and produce nuclear weapons. As George Perkovich, Director of the Nonproliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of India's Nuclear Bomb, has said “civilian nuclear power provides cover and comfort” for the development of nuclear weapons.” And “the larger a nation’s civilian program, the easier it is to hide weapons work.”

Despite these concerns, it is open to debate whether or not a U.S. decision to discontinue the GNEP would have any effect on other nation’s desire to obtain nuclear power. As nuclear historian Richard Rhodes stated in his book, Arsenals of Folly: The Making of a Nuclear Arms Race, “Eliminating US support for all nuclear power operations in the world would not prevent proliferation.” The proof is in the news papers—a 2006 article in the International Herald Tribune reported that “the son of Egypt's president urged his father's party on Tuesday to consider a proposal to develop nuclear energy” (Associated Press, 2006) and in 2006 the New York Times reported that “at least six Arab countries have reportedly sought to develop nuclear power programs, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria” (Fattah, 2006). Furthermore, a 2005 issue of Scientific American stated that Brazil, China, Egypt, Finland, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and Vietnam are building or planning nuclear plants (Hannum and Stanford 2005). With nuclear power expanding vertically and horizontally across the globe with or without US’s support, it would behoove the US to lead the way in developing a safer cheaper alternative. Our lack of support may not stop them, but our leadership could provide an option too beneficial for those countries combating energy poverty to resist.
With thirty countries possessing 435 commercial nuclear power reactors and 56 civil research reactors and only eight countries possessing nuclear weapons capability, concerns over proliferation at the state level; while valid, should not be overblown. The threat of non-state actors could still prove to be the world’s biggest concern as it grows its nuclear power capabilities.

Just how easily can the radioactive material and technology be redirected towards military use by terrorists?

Once again, the views on this subject are split. Garwin, author of Megawatts and Megatons: The Future of Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons cites a DOE report which claims that a “subnational organization could build a nuclear weapon with a yield of 1-3 kilotons from reactor grade plutonium” while Robert Gallucci, author of Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis, attests that “no terrorist group on earth is capable of building nuclear weapons, even with assistance.” The truth probably rests somewhere in the middle, in that it is not possible for a fly-by-night terrorist group to create a sophisticated nuclear device, however it is conceivable that a group with state support could obtain the necessary resources, facilities, and the time required to fashion a nuclear device. Regardless of this possibility, nearly all sources analyzed agree that the amount of effort needed to develop even a simple “dirty bomb” precludes terrorist organizations from choosing such a path when equally devastating methods are available at greater ease. Of course it wasn’t that easy to hi-jack planes and fly them into buildings either, so such a possibility should not be fully discounted.

The US absolutely needs to resolve its energy concerns. The 103 nuclear power plants currently operating have either met or will soon hit their forty-year lifespan i.e. how long a large nuclear plant can safely operate. Those that have already reached the forty-year mark have received twenty-year extensions, it is doubtful they will be given another such extension when those twenty years end. The last nuclear power plant in the US took thirty years to complete, if the US intends to, at the bare minimum, replace existing plants with new plants, the decision has to be made now if there is any hope of completing construction before the extended life-span has expired.

Even if this bare minimum is done, nuclear power will not resolve America’s dependence on oil unless cars suddenly start running on electricity, nor will it resolve America’s concerns about climate change unless the magnitude of growth previously mentioned can be fully realized within a few decades.

According to Thomas Friedman, author of Hot, Flat and Crowded, we would need to build a one nuclear plant a day for thirty-six years to reduce carbon emissions to levels significant enough to slow climate change.

If such growth does occur, the technical problem of waste would have to be resolved or else we’d merely prevent one environmental crisis while leaving another for the next generation.

And the cost of securing waste and weapons-capable material would need to be fully factored into the plan.

Finally, it should be recognized that if nuclear power is to be considered a solution to the global energy crisis all of its faults must be fully considered and addressed or else; instead of a panacea, the world will get a costly placebo.